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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
JUDGES! STOP DEFERRING TO CLASS-ACTION LAWYERS 
Brian Wolfman* 
 
I. THE PROBLEM 
I represent a national non-profit consumer rights organization, 
as an amicus, in a federal appeal challenging a district court’s 
approval of a class-action settlement of claims under the federal 
Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA).1 My client maintains that 
the district court erred in finding that the settlement was “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate,” which is the standard for class-action 
settlement approval under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
In particular, we argue that the district court committed a 
reversible legal error when it deferred to the class-action lawyers’ 
recommendation to approve the settlement because, in those 
lawyers’ view, it was fair, reasonable, and adequate. We also argue 
that the district court erred when, in approving the settlement, it 
relied in part on its belief that the plaintiffs’ counsel, whose work 
the judge had observed for years, are really good lawyers. 
The judge said that one factor that persuaded him to approve 
the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate was his “complete 
confidence in the ability and integrity” of the lawyers for the 
class.3 Those lawyers, he said, “are well known to me. They have 
                                                   
*  Visiting Professor and Co-Director, Institute of Public Representation, Georgetown 
University Law Center; formerly staff lawyer (1990-2004) and director (2004-2009), Public 
Citizen Litigation Group; co-coordinator, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, www.clpblog.org. 
As relevant here, Mr. Wolfman frequently is counsel for objectors to class-action 
settlements. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 
2012); Klier v. Elf Atochem, 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 
F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315 (3d 
Cir. 2001); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 
768 (3d Cir. 1995).  
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679l. 
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
3. Order [approving class-action settlement] at 16 in Miranda L. Day v. Persels & 
Associates, LLC, No. 8:10-cv-2463-T-TGW (Mar. 12, 2010) (Doc. 157) (hereinafter “Order”). 
J 
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exceptional legal abilities and the utmost integrity. Consequently, 
not only am I convinced that there was no fraud and collusion in 
this case, but that plaintiff’s counsel obtained in settlement the 
most that was achievable.”4 “Counsel for the Class,” the judge 
explained, “are seasoned attorneys and they have determined that 
this settlement is the best option under the circumstances.”5 A 
court, the judge concluded, “should be hesitant to substitute its 
judgment for that of counsel,” accurately quoting a recent, non-
precedential Eleventh Circuit decision.6 
To get a bit highfalutin for a moment, if you are thinking that 
what the judge did here is at odds with one of our most famous 
expositions of judicial independence—that “[t]he government of 
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of 
laws, and not of men”7—you’d be right. After all, the judge 
approved a class-action settlement based not solely on his 
independent scrutiny of the law and facts, but instead in 
significant part on deference to the class lawyers’ reputations and 
their “judgment” that the settlement was a good deal. 
But if you also thought that what the judge did here was 
unusual, you’d be very wrong. As noted, the judge followed a 
recent unpublished appellate decision, and dozens of decisions 
approving class-actions settlements have said the same or similar 
things, sometimes all but abdicating the judicial role to lawyers 
and nearly fawning over their reputations in the course of 
settlement approval. As I now explain, despite a few contrary 
voices, judicial deference to class-action lawyers’ 
recommendations, reputations, and experience remains an 
important part of the settlement-approval landscape. 
II. A FEW EXAMPLES AMONG MANY
A few examples of judicial deference help illustrate the 
problem. In approving complex antitrust settlements, one court 
trumpeted the lawyers on both sides of the case as “among the 
4. Id. at 22.
5. Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 15 (quoting Canupp v. Liberty Behavorial Healthcare Corp., 447 Fed. Appx.
976, 978 (11th Cir. 2011)); see also id. at 32 (quoting Canupp, 447 Fed. Appx. at 977–78 (“In 
considering the [class-action] settlement, the court is entitled to rely on the judgment of 
experienced counsel for the parties.”). 
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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best and most experienced antitrust litigators in the country.” 
“Consequently,” the judge said, “their opinion that these 
Settlements are fair, adequate, and reasonable is deserving of this 
Court’s consideration.”8 Although the court said it would not 
“blindly defer” to counsel, it nevertheless concluded that “it must 
consider that the Settlements were reached after several months 
of arms’ length negotiation by experienced counsel and that both 
counsel and all parties involved view the settlements as 
reasonable.”9 
In approving the settlement of an employment-discrimination 
class action, another court explained: 
Both of plaintiffs’ counsel … and several of the defendants’ 
counsel, have expressed themselves in favor of the settlement 
agreement. It is their opinion that the future course of conduct 
by the defendant … will be much improved, and that the 
affirmative action plan will be complied with in good faith. 
The Court has a high opinion of all counsel who have 
participated in this litigation. Their judgment as to the merits 
of the settlement agreement therefore weighs heavily with the 
Court, particularly since the Court is convinced that 
agreement was not reached easily but rather was the result of 
long and difficult negotiations.10 
And, in a case involving the alleged theft of corneas from the 
dead, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ lawyer had “over 23 years’ 
experience as a trial attorney” and was “extremely qualified and 
experienced in medical class action litigation.”11 The Court 
concluded that the lawyers’ “recommendation” leaned “in favor of 
approval of the proposed settlement.”12 These three cases are, as 
I’ve said, just examples. Many recent rulings follow the same 
pattern.13 
8. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2004).
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Wattleton v. Ladish Co., 89 F.R.D. 677, 685 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
11. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
12. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Chavarria v. N.Y. Airport Serv., LLC, 875 F. Supp.2d 164, 172–73 (E.D.N.Y.
2012); Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F. Supp.2d 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(recommendations of “experienced” counsel are entitled to “great weight”); Sabo v. United 
States, 102 Fed. 619, 628 (Fed. Cl. 2011); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp.2d 1360, 1380 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (explaining that court “must rely upon the judgment of experienced 
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III. SOME PUSHBACK (BUT NOT ENOUGH)
Not every court has followed in lockstep. One appellate court 
rejected deference to counsel’s settlement-approval 
recommendation because that would undermine judicial 
independence in a context where independence is essential.14 
“Reliance on counsel’s opinion,” the court explained, “tends to 
render the district court captive to the attorney and fosters rubber 
stamping by the court rather than the careful scrutiny which is 
essential in judicial approval of class action settlements.”15 Nor, 
for example, would it be possible to square deference to class-
action lawyers with the views of the late Third Circuit judge 
Edward Becker. Writing for the court in his important and wide-
ranging General Motors decision, Judge Becker insisted that 
district courts scrutinize class settlements with great care to 
protect the interests of absent class members, eyes wide open to 
both the fee-seeking motives of class counsel and the preclusion-
happy motives of defendants.16 
And the American Law Institute (ALI), in its 2009 Principles of 
the Law of Aggregate Litigation, expressed skepticism about 
deferring to class-action lawyers’ settlement recommendations, 
explaining (in understated fashion) that “the court should keep in 
mind that the lawyers who negotiated the settlement will rarely 
offer anything less than a strong, favorable endorsement.”17 But 
the ALI gave mixed signals. It said that a “court might give weight 
to the fact that counsel or the class or the defendant favors the 
settlement,” though it provided no guidance about when 
deference to defense counsel might be appropriate.18 On the 
plaintiffs’ side, on the other hand, the ALI said that “counsel’s 
willingness to propose a settlement may be entitled to some 
counsel and, absent fraud, ‘should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of 
counsel.’”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
14. See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1149–50 (11th Cir. 1983).
15. Id. at 1150.
16. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 783–800, 801–03 (3d Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 830 
(9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
17. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation ¶ 3.05(a), comment a, at 206 (Amer.
Law Inst. 2009). 
18. Id. at 205–06 (emphasis added).
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weight … [w]hen class counsel shares class members’ interest in 
maximizing claim values .…”19 
The ALI has a point, but not one that justifies judicial 
deference to the settlement recommendation of class-action 
lawyers. To be sure, linking the economic fate of plaintiffs’ class-
action lawyers to that of their clients is often a sensible tool for 
controlling the lawyers’ conduct.20 In particular, settlement 
provisions providing this link should encourage the lawyers to 
work hard to put money in the clients’ pockets once the settlement 
has been approved.21 Therefore, a judge properly may consider the 
presence of a provision tying fees to client compensation in 
deciding whether to approve a class settlement. 
But a provision that directly links the amount of lawyer 
compensation with the amount of client compensation is not a 
sufficient reason for a judge to defer to the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s 
recommendation to approve a settlement rather than exercising 
her independent judgment regarding the settlement terms 
themselves. After all, a key concern is whether a defendant, 
knowing that the plaintiffs’ lawyer has an interest in a fee,22 has 
offered less in settlement than is optimal, and that remains a 
concern where the settlement is structured to tie the lawyer’s 
economic interest to that of her clients. A quick, cheap settlement 
may benefit the plaintiffs’ lawyer (without optimizing client 
recovery), because she can reap a handsome fee with little work,23 
leaving her free to move on to the next case in short order.24 
19. Id. at 206.
20. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (requiring that
plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amounts actually paid to 
the class members); see also Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 851–54 
(5th Cir. 1998) (similar). 
21. See, e.g., Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375, 380 (D.
Mass. 1997); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 126, 1284 (S.D. Ohio 1996), recon. denied, 
927 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (S.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d in rel. part, 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996). 
22. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 802 (3d Cir. 1995). 
23. Id. at 801–02, 803.
24. The ALI also explained that reliance on class-action lawyers’ experience “should
not normally lighten the burden” of showing that the settlement is fair and that the 
fairness determination ordinarily should depend on “the specific facts of the settlement.” 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation ¶3.05, comment c, at 209 (Amer. Law. Inst. 
2009) (emphasis added). The ALI did not, however, describe the “abnormal” circumstances 
in which reliance on a lawyer’s experience might be warranted. 
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To be sure, in some cases, only the fairness of the amount of a 
settlement is disputed. In that situation, the court will attempt to 
appraise the value of the class claims by discounting the value of 
the claims at their maximum by the risk of non-recovery.25 This 
assessment is imprecise (of course), and so the court will generally 
approve a settlement if it falls within a range of reasonableness.26 
But determining that range should not be an exercise in deference 
to settling counsel. Rather, the court should demand information 
from the settling parties that would assist the court in making its 
valuation. The court should also pay careful attention to objectors 
who have an incentive to question the settling parties’ valuation. 
Again, in this circumstance, even where class counsel’s fee is tied 
to the class members’ recovery, counsel may be willing to settle 
sub-optimally because that could enable her to settle more quickly 
and move on to the next case. 
IV. WHY THINGS SHOULD CHANGE
As explained, despite some pushback, judges continue to defer 
to the class-action lawyers in approving class-action settlements. 
That needs to change. In my view, a court should never give 
weight to settling counsel’s judgment about the wisdom of a class 
settlement or rely on class counsel’s reputation or experience in 
assessing a settlement’s fairness or legality. That assessment 
should be solely for the court. Any other approach undermines 
judicial independence in a context where independence is critical. 
To appreciate why deference of the kind that I’ve described 
should be rejected consider how a claim for deference would be 
viewed in ordinary, one-on-one litigation. Assume that a judge is 
presented with a motion in limine. The plaintiff’s brief argues that 
the evidence is not hearsay and therefore admissible, while the 
defendant’s brief, naturally, argues that the evidence is hearsay 
and must be excluded. And suppose that, in ruling on the motion, 
the judge says, “This hearsay issue presents a close case, and the 
lawyers seem to know more about the problem than I do. Having 
read the briefs and reviewed the facts and law, I rule in the 
25. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Girsh v. Jepsen, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (1974)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d 
Cir. 1974)). 
26. See, e.g., Dewey, 681 F.3d at 179.
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plaintiff’s favor, deferring to the judgment of plaintiff’s counsel 
and taking judicial notice of her fine reputation for first-rate legal 
analysis and integrity.” This hypothetical ruling would almost 
certainly never occur in real life because a judge is supposed to 
decide cases independently, basing her decisions solely on the law 
and facts. And, if a district judge in Des Moines issued that ruling, 
it would be reversed before it got half way to St. Louis. 
With the hearsay example in mind, now consider class-action 
settlements. There is more reason to be concerned about 
abdication of judicial independence and deference to counsel in 
that context than in traditional one-on-one litigation. In class 
cases, almost all the plaintiffs—the absentees—have agreed to 
nothing because they have no relationship with their lawyer. As a 
result, they have no way to monitor their lawyer’s conduct and 
demand that she act in their interests. Class settlements therefore 
present the possibility of collusive (or at least sub-optimal) deals, 
in which the defendant maximizes its “purchase [of] res judicata,”27 
and the class members receive little or nothing, while, in 
exchange, plaintiffs’ counsel receives “red-carpet treatment on 
fees.”28 That’s not news. Legal academics and some judges have 
appreciated these concerns for years.29 
Although, as indicated earlier, some courts have been effusive 
in their praise for class-action lawyers and their recommendations, 
most that have deferred to the views of counsel have not provided 
a detailed rationale—sometimes saying only that settlement is a 
good thing and counsel is more familiar with the nuances of the 
case than they are.30 
The lack of information is a concern. Once a class action 
settles, the named parties are non-adverse, and judges do not have 
their lawyers’ help in ferreting out the case’s strengths and 
weaknesses as they do in other cases. This non-adversity, and the 
27. Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).
29. For a partial collection of judicial opinions and legal scholarship on the potential
for break down in the agency relationship between lawyer and client in class actions, see 
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2010). For a recent judicial 
discussion of the problem, see Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 830 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
30. See, e.g., Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 874 F. Supp.2d 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
2012). 
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resulting concern about an information deficit, certainly 
distinguishes the hearsay-objection example discussed earlier. So, 
perhaps judges think deference is appropriate when they perceive 
themselves to be in the dark.31 Maybe that’s why, in approving 
class-action settlements, with little litigation-engendered hard 
evidence at their disposal, courts often just assume that counsel 
for the parties’ engaged in “arm’s-length” negotiations in the 
absence of evidence of collusion.32 
But the settling parties’ non-adversity cuts against deference to 
class-action lawyers, not in favor of it. As Judge Easterbrook has 
noted, the “fairness hearing” required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e)(2) may be a “staged performance,” jointly 
produced by class and defense counsel, at which “the court can’t 
vindicate the class’s rights because the friendly presentation 
means that it lacks essential information.”33 The answer to that 
serious problem is not to make it worse by deferring to the 
lawyers, but to insist that trial courts probe the settling parties’ 
assertions, listen, but not defer, to objectors (the only true 
adversaries),34 and “act[] as a fiduciary … [to] serve as a guardian 
of the rights of absent class members.”35 
31. See, e.g., id. (“Recommendations of experienced counsel are entitled to great
weight in evaluating a proposed settlement in a class action because such counsel are most 
closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”) (emphasis added; citation 
omitted). 
32. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33 (1st
Cir. 2009); Sabo, 102 Fed. Cl. at 628. I have never understood why, in approving class 
settlements, courts so often rely on the parties’ “arm’s-length” negotiations and the absence 
of collusion. To be sure, in some cases, judges are apprised of the intensity and the length 
of negotiations and the degree to which the parties’ have exchanged information relevant 
to the issues on the table. But class-action lawyers are sophisticated. It is unlikely that a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer explicitly would ask defense counsel for a fee in exchange for providing 
the defendant with a low-value settlement that rids it of a potentially costly legal problem. 
It is equally unlikely that a class-action defense lawyer would respond to an offer of that 
sort by saying that his client would like to collude by accepting the plaintiffs’ offer. In any 
event, in most cases, settlement discussions go on behind closed doors, and so evidence of a 
sub-optimal deal generally is going to be the deal itself. See Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation ¶ 3.05, comment c, at 209; Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 
F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., joined by Manion, Rovner, and Wood, JJ., 
and Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
33. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., joined by Manion, Rovner, and Wood, JJ., and Posner, C.J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
34. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 830 (“Objectors provide a critically valuable service of
providing knowledge from a different point of view, but one that is too often not used 
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V. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH DEFERENCE 
One element of the judge’s ruling approving the CROA 
settlement underscores why courts should never defer to counsel 
in approving a class-action settlement. Recall that the judge’s 
settlement approval there was premised in part on the fact that 
class counsel were “well known to me,” giving the judge a basis 
for praising their “exceptional legal abilities” and “utmost 
integrity.”36 But, like many class-action settlements, the CROA 
settlement was nationwide in scope, comprised of absentees (and 
objectors’ lawyers) who were unknown to the judge. I have 
represented absent class member objectors for a couple decades in 
cases around the country,37 and I have never been a local lawyer 
“known” to the trial judge. And I am not alone. Most objectors’ 
counsel are not regulars before the court and, thus, are unable to 
garner the “well-known-to-me” deference that the judge accorded 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the CROA case.38 The result of deference 
to settling counsel is to give them an irrational leg up on the 
objectors and their lawyers. 
Finally, it’s worth examining why judges may like the idea of 
“deference” to class-action lawyers. Recall that the judge in the 
CROA case said that “the court should be hesitant to substitute its 
effectively.”). On the beneficial role of objectors generally, see, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET 
AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 491–96 (Rand Inst. 
for Civil Justice 2000). I recognize that “[i]n some circumstances objectors may use an 
appeal [from the approval of a class-action settlement] as a means of leveraging 
compensation for themselves or their counsel.” Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 507 
F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007). Though beyond the scope of this essay, there are ways to 
police objectors while encouraging them to play their critical role. See, e.g., Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009). 
35. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
36. Order, supra note 3, at 22.
37. See, e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2012); Klier v. 
Elf Atochem, 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 
2005); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001); In re 
General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
38. That judges have given weight to their longstanding experience with the parties’
counsel in approving class-action settlements suggests that, all other things equal, clients 
would do well to hire local counsel known to the judge. For the antitrust implications of 
certain class-action settlement practices, see, for example, Susan P. Koniak & George M. 
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1089–1102 (1996). 
2013 Judges! Stop Deferring to Class-Action Lawyers 89 
 
judgment for that of counsel.”39 Again, the judge was not breaking 
new ground; many other judges have said the same thing.40 
Perhaps this rationale is appealing because it has a ring to it. 
Sometimes, as in certain administrative law contexts,41 or in 
appellate review of district-court fact finding,42 courts use that 
language because the law accords one public official primary 
decision making authority over another. 
But the law should not accord deference to lawyers. Lawyers 
are charged by the adversary system with making arguments for 
clients, not to determine the law and facts. Put another way, 
contrary to the understanding of judges who defer to class-action 
lawyers and worry about second-guessing those lawyers’ 
settlement recommendations, it is exactly the role of a court to 
substitute its judgment for the judgments of lawyers. That’s what 
courts do! And that should be all the more true in the class 
settlement context because there, as I’ve noted, some lawyers, 
unless properly policed, may strike a deal that benefits them at 
the class members’ expense. 
VI. CONCLUSION
I’m not anti-class action. I favor its vigorous use. Class actions 
are often enormously useful tools for justice, and, for decades, 
they have compensated discrimination victims, reformed 
oppressive governmental institutions, and deterred a wide array of 
wrongful business conduct where individuals, acting alone, would 
not have had the means or adequate incentive to sue on their 
own.43 
But class actions can be abused, souring the public, politicians, 
and even judges, and jeopardizing the prospect of justice. The 
trick is to come up with standards for processing class actions—
particularly class-action settlements—that help promote class 
39. Order, supra note 3, at 22.
40. See, e.g., Canupp v. Liberty Behavorial Healthcare Corp., 447 Fed. Appx. 976, 977–
78 (11th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922–23 (6th Cir. 1983); Lopez v. 
City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. 285, 292 (D.N.M. 2002). 
41. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
43. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.3d 289, 294–95 (7th Cir. 2010)
(noting both the structural concerns leading to class-action abuse and that class actions are 
“indispensable for the litigation of many meritorious claims”). 
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actions while curbing their misuse.44 One small step in that 
direction is to assure that courts never defer to the views, 
reputation, or experience of settling counsel in determining 
whether a class-action settlement is fair and lawful. 
44. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR
LITIGATING AND SETTLING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS, 255 F.R.D. 215 (2d ed. 2006); Brian 
Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Action 
Settlements, 71 N.Y.U.L. REV. 439, 477–507 (1996).
